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“WITHOUT PRECEDENTIAL VALUE”–WHEN 
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NORTH CAROLINA ARE EQUALLY DIVIDED* 
JOHN V. ORTH** 
When the justices of the Supreme Court of North Carolina are 
equally divided, they routinely issue a per curiam order affirming 
the decision below but declaring that the decision of the lower 
court stands “without precedential value.” This result was 
reached in no less than ten cases in 2013. Part I of this Article 
traces the history of this formula since the first reported instance 
in 1893. Part II considers the changing context of these decisions 
as the North Carolina Court of Appeals became operational in 
1967 and steadily grew in size and importance. Leaving a 
decision of the intermediate appellate court as the final judicial 
resolution but “without precedential value” means that the 
decision is res judicata but does not have the effect of stare 
decisis. As a consequence of this procedure, the decision of the 
court of appeals would have created a binding precedent if only 
it had not been reviewed by the supreme court. This Article 
concludes that the emergence of the court of appeals as a 
precedent-setting court in the last twenty-five years indicates the 
need to reconsider the effect of decisions by an equally divided 
supreme court and recommends that a court of appeals decision 
affirmed by an equally divided supreme court be recognized as 
having precedential value.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 20, 2013, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
announced its decision in State v. Franklin.1 
PER CURIAM. 
Justice BEASLEY took no part in the consideration or decision 
of this case. The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
left undisturbed and stands without precedential value. See, e.g., 
Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 367 N.C. 305, 716 S.E.2d 
849 (2011) [sic]2; Goldston v. State, 364 N.C. 416, 700 S.E.2d 223 
(2010). 
AFFIRMED.3 
Franklin was only the latest of ten cases from 2013, all from decisions 
of the court of appeals, in which the participating justices were 
equally divided.4 The decision in each case was rendered in nearly 
 
 1. 367 N.C. 183, 752 S.E.2d 143 (2013) (per curiam). 
 2. The correct citation of Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary is: 365 N.C. 305, 716 
S.E.2d 849 (2011). 
 3. Franklin, 367 N.C. at 183, 752 S.E.2d at 143. 
 4. The remaining nine cases were: Samost v. Duke Univ., 367 N.C. 185, 751 S.E.2d 
611 (2013) (per curiam) (Jackson, J., did not participate); State v. Huss, 367 N.C. 162, 749 
S.E.2d 279 (2013) (per curiam) (Beasley, J., did not participate); State v. Pizano-Trejo, 367 
N.C. 111, 748 S.E.2d 144 (2013) (per curiam) (Beasley, J., did not participate); State v. 
Hough, 367 N.C. 79, 743 S.E.2d 174 (2013) (per curiam) (Jackson, J., did not participate); 
John Conner Constr., Inc. v. Grandfather Holding Co., 366 N.C. 547, 742 S.E.2d 802 
(2013) (per curiam) (Beasley, J., did not participate); Gonzalez v. Worrell, 366 N.C. 501, 
739 S.E.2d 552 (2013) (per curiam) (Beasley, J., did not participate); Ochsner v. Elon 
Univ., 366 N.C. 472, 737 S.E.2d 737 (2013) (per curiam) (Jackson, J., did not participate); 
Baysden v. State, 366 N.C. 370, 736 S.E.2d 173 (2013) (per curiam) (Beasley, J., did not 
participate). In State v. Craven, 367 N.C. 51, 744 S.E.2d 458 (2013) (Beasley, J., did not 
participate), the justices were equally divided on one issue. In John Conner Construction 
the court also held that a petition for discretionary review of additional issues was 
improvidently allowed. 366 N.C. at 547, 742 S.E.2d at 802. A further case in which the 
justices were equally divided, Tyndall v. Ford Motor Co., 367 N.C. 161, 162, 749 S.E.2d 
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identical language.5 Such a decision of the supreme court leaves the 
decision of the court of appeals as the final judicial resolution of the 
dispute. Not merely “left undisturbed,” the decision of the 
intermediate appellate court is “affirmed.”6 In consequence, the 
particular dispute resolved in each case cannot be relitigated by the 
parties. As to other state courts, however, the case stands on a 
different footing. While the decision of one panel of the court of 
appeals is generally binding on all other panels of that court,7 the 
decisions in these cases, although affirmed, stand “without 
precedential value.”8 It is not necessary for other panels or for the 
trial courts to follow the lead of the court of appeals9 if the same 
issues decided in these cases arise in others. This remarkable result 
means that the decisions of the court of appeals in these cases are res 
judicata, but do not produce the effect of stare decisis.10 The disputes 
are resolved, but no precedents are established. Even more 
remarkable is the fact that if the same ten cases had not been 
reviewed by the supreme court, the decisions of the court of appeals 
would stand with precedential value.11 
 
279, 279 (2013) (per curiam) (Beasley, J., did not participate), was an appeal from orders of 
the court of appeals, rather than a final decision.  
 5. The decision in John Conner Construction omits the words “is left undisturbed[.]” 
See 336 N.C. at 547, 742 S.E.2d at 802. Otherwise the wording of the court’s holding in all 
ten cases is identical. See cases cited supra note 4. In Tyndall, the interlocutory appeal, the 
orders issued by the court of appeals are “left undisturbed,” 367 N.C. at 162, 749 S.E.2d at 
279; no mention is made concerning precedential value, nor are any cases cited. 
 6. E.g., Franklin, 367 N.C. at 183, 752 S.E.2d at 143. 
 7. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) 
(“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different 
case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been 
overturned by a higher court.”). 
 8. E.g., Franklin, 367 N.C. at 183, 752 S.E.2d at 143. 
 9. I have followed the lead of the supreme court and referred to the decision of a 
panel of the court of appeals as “the decision of the Court of Appeals,” although it leads 
to the odd conclusion that in cases in which a decision of the court of appeals (in that 
sense) is affirmed by an equally divided supreme court, the court of appeals is not bound 
by its own precedent. In cases in which a panel of the court of appeals is divided, as few as 
two judges can render a decision of the court of appeals. Without a procedure for sitting 
en banc, the court of appeals is no more than a collection of panels of three judges. See 
John V. Orth, Why the North Carolina Court of Appeals Should Have a Procedure for 
Sitting En Banc, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1981, 1982 (1997) (“In a real sense, the court of appeals 
as presently operated is not a single court at all, but only a collection of panels.”). 
 10. See Reese v. Barbee, 134 N.C. App. 728, 729–30, 518 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1999) 
(holding that the decision of a prior panel in an earlier phase of this litigation, Reese v. 
Barbee, 129 N.C. App. 823, 501 S.E.2d 698 (1998), affirmed by an equally divided supreme 
court in Reese v. Barbee, 350 N.C. 60, 510 S.E.2d 374 (1999) (per curiam), was and 
remained the law of the case). 
 11. Pizano-Trejo, Huss, Hough, Ochsner, and Craven involved discretionary review of 
a unanimous decision of a panel of the court of appeals pursuant to North Carolina 
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In all ten cases, the Supreme Court of North Carolina cited 
Amward Homes, Goldston, or both.12 The decisions in those earlier 
cases, also decided by an equally divided court, were announced using 
the same language as in Franklin. In Amward Homes and Goldston 
the court cited further supporting cases. In Amward Homes it cited 
Hall v. Toreros II, Inc.13 In Goldston it cited Formyduval v. Britt14 and 
Pitts v. American Security Insurance Co.15 What was said with respect 
to Amward Homes and Goldston can be said in turn of Hall, 
Formyduval, and Pitts. All three were decided with the same words: 
“[T]he decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
 
General Statutes section 7A-31. See State v. Pizano-Trejo, 367 N.C. 111, 111, 748 S.E.2d 
144, 144 (2013) (per curiam); State v. Huss, 367 N.C. 162, 162, 749 S.E.2d 279, 279 (2013) 
(per curiam); State v. Hough, 367 N.C. 79, 79, 743 S.E.2d 174, 174 (2013) (per curiam); 
Ochsner v. Elon Univ., 366 N.C. 472, 472, 737 S.E.2d 737, 737 (2013) (per curiam); State v. 
Craven, 367 N.C. 51, 51, 744 S.E.2d 458, 458 (2013). John Conner Construction, Gonzalez, 
and Baysden involved both an appeal from a decision of a divided panel of the court of 
appeals pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes section 7A-30(2) and discretionary 
review of additional issues pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes section 7A-31. See 
John Conner Constr., Inc. v. Grandfather Holding Co., 366 N.C. 547, 547, 742 S.E.2d 802, 
802 (2013) (per curiam); Gonzalez v. Worrell, 366 N.C. 501, 501, 739 S.E.2d 552, 552 
(2013) (per curiam); Baysden v. State, 366 N.C. 370, 370, 736 S.E.2d 173, 173 (2013) (per 
curiam). Franklin and Samost involved an appeal from a decision of a divided panel of the 
court of appeals pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes section 7A-30(2). See 
Franklin, 367 N.C. at 183, 752 S.E.2d at 143; Samost v. Duke Univ., 367 N.C. 185, 185, 751 
S.E.2d 611, 611 (2013) (per curiam). The eleventh case, Tyndall, involved review of orders 
of the court of appeals pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes section 7A-32(b). See 
Tyndall v. Ford Motor Co., 367 N.C. 161, 161, 749 S.E.2d 279, 279 (2013) (per curiam).  
 12. In Franklin, Hough, John Conner, and Gonzalez the Court cited both Amward 
Homes, 365 N.C. 305, 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011) (per curiam), and Goldston v. State, 364 N.C. 
416, 700 S.E.2d 223 (2010) (per curiam). Franklin, 367 N.C. at 183, 752 S.E.2d at 143; 
Hough, 367 N.C. at 79, 743 S.E.2d at 174; John Conner Construction, 366 N.C. at 547, 742 
S.E.2d at 802; Gonzalez, 366 N.C. at 502, 739 S.E.2d at 552. In Samost, Huss, and Ochsner 
it cited Amward Homes but replaced Goldston with State v. Pastuer, 365 N.C. 287, 715 
S.E.2d 850 (2011) (per curiam). Samost, 367 N.C. at 185, 751 S.E.2d at 611; Huss, 367 N.C. 
at 162, 749 S.E.2d at 279; Ochsner, 366 N.C. at 473, 737 S.E.2d at 738. In Baysden the court 
cited Goldston but replaced Amward Homes with Formyduval v. Britt, 361 N.C. 214, 639 
S.E.2d 443 (2007) (per curiam), and Pitts v. American Security Insurance Co., 356 N.C. 292, 
569 S.E.2d 647 (2002) (per curiam). Baysden, 366 N.C. at 370, 736 S.E.2d at 173. In 
Pizano-Trejo and Craven the court cited Goldston alone. Pizano-Trejo, 367 N.C. at 111, 
748 S.E.2d at 144; Craven, 367 N.C. at 58, 744 S.E.2d at 462. The eleventh case, Tyndall, 
reviewing orders issued by the court of appeals, cited no cases. 367 N.C. at 161, 749 S.E.2d 
at 279. 
 13. See Amward Homes, 365 N.C. at 306, 716 S.E.2d at 850 (citing Hall v. Toreros II, 
Inc., 363 N.C. 114, 114, 678 S.E.2d 656, 656 (2009) (per curiam)). 
 14. Goldston, 364 N.C. at 417, 700 S.E.2d at 223 (citing Formyduval, 361 N.C. 215, 639 
S.E.2d 443 (citing State v. Harrison, 360 N.C. 394, 627 S.E.2d 461 (2006))). 
 15. Id. (citing Pitts, 356 N.C. 292, 569 S.E.2d 647 (2002) (per curiam) (citing Reese, 350 
N.C. 60, 510 S.E.2d 374 (1999) (per curiam))). 
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without precedential value.”16 Each case cited further supporting 
cases, which repeated the formula with variations in a daisy chain of 
cases, extending back more than a century.17 
Part I of this Article documents the exact language used in that 
line of cases beginning in 1893 and traces the emergence of the 
modern formula to cases decided in the 1980s. Part II considers the 
changing contexts of these decisions as the court of appeals became 
operational in 1967 and steadily grew in size and importance. Noting 
the difference between an appellate court mainly intended for the 
correction of errors and one looked to for precedential guidance on 
issues of law, this part concludes that the emergence of the court of 
appeals as a precedent-setting court indicates the need to reconsider 
the effect of a decision by an equally divided supreme court when 
reviewing a decision of the court of appeals.18 
I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The first North Carolina decision to explain the effect of an 
equal division of the justices was decided more than one hundred 
twenty years ago.19 On November 14, 1893, the supreme court 
 
 16. Hall, 363 N.C. at 114, 678 S.E.2d at 656; Formyduval, 361 N.C. at 216, 639 S.E.2d 
at 443; Pitts, 356 N.C. at 293, 569 S.E.2d 647–48. 
 17. Compare Franklin, 367 N.C. at 183, 752 S.E.2d at 143 (“[T]he decision of the 
Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential value.”), with Town 
of Durham v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 113 N.C. 240, 241, 18 S.E. 208, 208 (1893) 
(“[F]ollowing the uniform practice of appellate courts in such cases, the judgment below 
stands, not as a precedent, but as the decision in this case.”). 
 18. This article is concerned with appeals from the court of appeals that are decided 
by an equally divided supreme court, not with appeals from a superior court that are 
decided by an equally divided supreme court. From 1985 to 2013 inclusive, only two of 
fifty-four cases decided by a divided supreme court bypassed the court of appeals. See 
State v. Long, 365 N.C. 5, 705 S.E.2d 735 (2011); Polk v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
328 N.C. 730, 403 S.E.2d 255 (1991). See also cases cited in Appendix III. 
 19. From its creation by statute in 1818 until 1868, the supreme court consisted of 
three judges. See JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA 
STATE CONSTITUTION 130 (2d ed. 2013). The 1868 constitution, the first to give the court 
constitutional status, increased the total to five, but the post-Reconstruction amendments 
of 1876 reduced it again to three. Id. Since then, the size of the court has grown steadily: to 
five in 1888 by constitutional amendment; to seven in 1937 by statute as authorized by a 
constitutional amendment adopted in 1935. Id. Although the court today remains at a 
membership of seven, a constitutional amendment adopted in 1962 and carried over in the 
1971 Constitution empowers the general assembly to increase the court’s membership to 
nine. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 6; see JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH 
CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 130 (2d ed. 2013). Because the court normally operates 
with an odd number of justices, equal divisions occur only in cases of vacancy or recusal. 
For a historical review of the size of a supreme court, see JOHN V. ORTH, HOW MANY 
JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A SUPREME COURT? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–21 (2006).  
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announced its decision in Town of Durham v. Richmond & Danville 
Railroad Co.:20 
Clark, J.  
In this case both the plaintiff and the defendants appealed. Mr. 
Justice Burwell did not sit, and the court is evenly divided. The 
appeals have now been standing on this docket four terms. 
Under these circumstances, following the uniform practice of 
appellate courts in such cases, the judgment below stands, not 
as a precedent, but as the decision in this case. Marshall, C.J., in 
Etting v. Bank, 11 Wheat. 59; Taney, C.J., in Benton v. 
Woolsey, 12 Pet. 27; and in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; 
Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413, 424; Chase, C.J., in U.S. v. 
Reeside, 19 U.S. (Lawy. Ed.) 391; Durant v. Essex Co., 8 Allen, 
103. The appellants will respectively pay the costs, each in their 
own appeal. Plaintiff’s appeal affirmed. Defendants’ appeal 
affirmed.21 
Unlike the recent cases in which the justices were equally 
divided, the decision in Durham was authored by one justice rather 
than announced per curiam, and it concluded by affirming the 
“[p]laintiff’s appeal” and the “[d]efendants’ appeal,”22 rather than by 
affirming the decision of the lower court. The judgment of the trial 
court remained the decision in this case, but—like all trial court 
decisions—it did not establish a precedent. 
As authority on “the uniform practice of appellate courts in such 
cases,”23 Justice Clark cited five decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court and one decision of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court.24 In the earliest case, Etting v. Bank of the United 
 
 20. 113 N.C. 240, 18 S.E. 208 (1893). 
 21. Id. at 240–41, 18 S.E. at 208 (footnote omitted) (quoting the Southeastern 
reporter). Note, the substantive text and formatting of the Southeastern and North 
Carolina reporters vary for this case.  
 22. I am not familiar with any other case in which an appeal from a lower court, as 
opposed to a decision of a lower court, was held to be affirmed, let alone two opposed 
appeals. 
 23. Durham, 113 N.C. at 241, 18 S.E. at 208. 
 24. See id. Etting, Benton, Holmes, Bridge Co., and Reeside were decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court. See infra notes 25–30. A footnote to the decision in 
Durham indicated that the decision in Reeside, which was reported in Lawyers’ Edition 
but not in the U.S. Reports, was “not officially reported.” Durham, 113 N.C. at 241, 18 
S.E. at 208 (1893). Durant was a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
See infra note 34. Consistent with practice at the time, Justice Clark cited the cases by the 
names of the reporters. The nominative reports are now incorporated, respectively, in the 
U.S. Reports and in the Massachusetts Reports. On the nominative reporters generally 
and the U.S. Reports in particular, see KENT C. OLSON, PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL 
RESEARCH § 7.1(c), at 235–36 (2009). 
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States,25 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion discussed the substantive 
issue involved in the case and, after noting that several prior cases had 
been cited in the argument, concluded: 
No attempt will be made to analyze them, or to decide on their 
application to the case before us, because the Judges are 
divided respecting it. Consequently, the principles of law which 
have been argued cannot be settled; but the judgment is 
affirmed, the Court being divided in opinion upon it.26 
As Marshall explained, the decision in Etting created no Supreme 
Court precedent: “[T]he principles of law which have been argued 
cannot be settled.”27 The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, 
but Marshall said nothing about its precedential value. The wording 
used by Chief Justice Taney in Benton v. Woolsey28 and Holmes v. 
Jennison29 is similar, as is the wording used by Chief Justice Chase in 
United States v. Reeside.30 
The next cases relied on by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in Durham echoed the reasoning of Etting. Washington 
Bridge Co. v. Stewart was a proceeding in the United States Supreme 
Court subsequent to an earlier unreported decision by that Court in 
the same case.31 Justice Wayne, speaking for the Court, noted that as 
the decree appealed from had been previously affirmed, “[i]ts having 
been affirmed by a divided court, can make no difference as to the 
conclusiveness of the affirmance upon the rights of the parties.”32 
That is, the decision affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court 
was res judicata and became the law of the case. Similarly, Durant v. 
Essex Co. involved a subsequent state court proceeding in a case that 
 
 25. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 59, 77 (1826). Etting involved a claim of fraud committed by 
James McCulloch, president of the Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States. Id. 
at 62–63. McCulloch had earlier been a party in the landmark constitutional case 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 26. Etting, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) at 78.  
 27. Id. 
 28. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 27, 31 (1838) (“[N]o opinion can be pronounced on the point, 
because the judges are equally divided upon it. Upon this division, the judgment of the 
court below is necessarily affirmed.”). 
 29. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 561 (1840) (“The members of the Court, after the fullest 
discussions, are so divided that no opinion can be delivered as the opinion of the Court.”). 
 30. 19 L. Ed. 391, 392 (1869) (“The judges of this court being equally divided in 
opinion . . . it is ordered that the judgment of the Court of Claims be affirmed.”). 
 31. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 413, 413 (1845) (“The same case was before the court at January 
term, 1840, and the decree of the court below affirmed by the Supreme Court, but in 
consequence of the court being equally divided, no opinion was given, and no report of the 
case published.”). 
 32. Id. at 424 (citing Etting, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 59 (1826)). 
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had previously been affirmed by an equally divided United States 
Supreme Court.33 Justice Chapman, on behalf of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, agreed with Justice Wayne: “If a cause is 
brought up from a lower court on a question of law by exception or 
appeal, and the judges are equally divided, the judgment of the lower 
court is commonly affirmed.”34 Once affirmed, it became the law of 
the case. 
From 1893 until the creation of the court of appeals in 1967, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina decided all cases in which the 
justices were equally divided with similar language.35 At first, the 
court repeated the words of Durham: “[T]he judgment below stands, 
not as a precedent, but as the decision in this case.”36 Later, the 
formula varied. Sometimes the court held that “the judgment 
appealed from stands, but not as a precedent,”37 sometimes simply 
that “this decision does not become a precedent,”38 or that “the 
judgment below will be affirmed without becoming a precedent.”39 
Often the court added, as in Durham, that it was “[f]ollowing the 
uniform practice of appellate courts in such cases,”40 or that it was 
acting “according to the uniform practice of appellate courts,”41 or “in 
 
 33. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1868). Justice Field, writing for the Court, described 
the entry of a judgment of affirmance by an equally divided court as “only the most 
convenient mode of expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in conformity 
with the action of the court below, and that that court can proceed to enforce its 
judgment.” Id. He added, citing Etting: “The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, 
or writ of error, were dismissed.” Id. 
 34. Durant v. Essex Co., 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 103, 107–08 (1864) (citing Etting, 24 U.S. 
(11 Wheat.) 59 (1826)).  
 35. Cases from 1893 to 1967 in which the justices were equally divided are collected in 
Appendix I. 
 36. Compare Durham v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 113 N.C. 240, 240, 18 S.E. 
208, 208 (1893), with Puryear v. Lynch, 121 N.C. 255, 256, 28 S.E. 410, 410 (1897) (“[T]he 
judgment below stands, not as precedent, but as a decision in the case.”), and Morehead 
Banking Co. v. City of Burlington, 124 N.C. 251, 251, 32 S.E. 558, 558 (1899) (“[T]he 
judgment below stands, not as a precedent, but as the decision in this case.”). 
 37. Allen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 211 N.C. 736, 736, 190 S.E. 735, 735 (1937) (per 
curiam). 
 38. Whitehead v. City of Charlotte, 221 N.C. 539, 540, 20 S.E.2d 57, 57–58 (1942) (per 
curiam). 
 39. Schoenith v. Town & Country Realty Co., 244 N.C. 601, 602, 94 S.E.2d 592, 593 
(1956) (per curiam). 
 40. Durham, 113 N.C. at 241, 18 S.E. at 208 (quoting the South Eastern Reporter); see 
Jenkins v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 187 N.C. 864, 864, 123 S.E. 82, 82 (1924) (“Following the 
uniform practice of appellate courts in such cases . . . .”). 
 41. Seay v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 832, 833, 179 S.E. 888, 889 (1935) (per 
curiam). 
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accordance with the usual practice in such cases.”42 Sometimes the 
court stated that it was acting “in accord with the practice of the 
Court,”43 or “[u]nder the Rule of the Court,”44 or “according to [the] 
usual practice of the Court in such cases.”45 Almost always the 
opinion stated, in one form of words or another, that affirmance by an 
equally divided supreme court did not create a precedent.46 
Even after the 1967 creation of North Carolina’s intermediate 
appellate court, the formula remained essentially the same. The first 
case to reach the supreme court and result in an equal division of the 
justices after the creation of the court of appeals was an appeal from a 
superior court, Parrish v. Piedmont Publishing Co.,47 that had 
apparently been docketed before the new appellate court began to 
function.48 In words reminiscent of Durham, the court announced: 
“[T]he judgment of the lower court is affirmed after the manner of 
the usual practice of appellate courts in such cases and stands as the 
decision in this case without becoming a precedent.”49 
The first case from the court of appeals to reach the supreme 
court and result in an equal division of the justices was Sharpe v. 
Pugh.50 Without regard to the fact that the case was on appeal from a 
decision of the intermediate appellate court and not of a trial court, 
the supreme court announced the effect of its decision, citing Parrish: 
“This equal division requires that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals be affirmed without becoming a precedent.”51 A month later, 
 
 42. Johnston v. Halifax Paper Co., 214 N.C. 828, 829, 199 S.E. 20, 20 (1938) (per 
curiam). 
 43. Pafford v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 218 N.C. 782, 782, 11 S.E.2d 548, 549 (1940); 
Mills v. Jones, 213 N.C. 802, 802, 196 S.E. 308, 308 (1938) (per curiam); Collins v. Sec. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 800, 800, 195 S.E. 793, 793 (1938) (per curiam). 
 44. Suiter v. Swift & Co. Fertilizer Works, 221 N.C. 541, 542, 20 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1942) 
(per curiam). 
 45. Bullard v. Hotel Holding Co., 225 N.C. 766, 767, 33 S.E.2d 480, 480 (1945) (per 
curiam); Pafford, 218 N.C. at 783, 11 S.E.2d at 549 (“[I]n accord with the usual practice in 
such cases . . . .”) (internal emphasis added). 
 46. A few early cases simply affirmed the lower court. See Miller v. Bank of 
Washington, 176 N.C. 152, 161, 96 S.E. 977, 981 (1918) (“[T]he judgment of the Court 
below is affirmed.”); Ward v. Odell Mfg. Co., 126 N.C. 946, 946, 36 S.E. 194, 194 (1900) 
(“[T]he judgment below is affirmed.”); Boone v. Peebles, 126 N.C. 824, 825, 36 S.E. 193, 
194 (1900) (“[T]he opinion of the court below must prevail . . . .”). 
 47. 271 N.C. 711, 157 S.E.2d 334 (1967) (per curiam). 
 48. Although the court of appeals became effective on January 1, 1967, the case made 
its way to the supreme court and bypassed the newly created court. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
7A-16 (2013). 
 49. Id. at 711–12, 157 S.E.2d at 334. 
 50. 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974) (per curiam). 
 51. Id. at 210, 209 S.E.2d at 456–57. 
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the court decided State v. Johnson,52 an appeal from a decision of a 
superior court.53 Again, the court cited Parrish: “[T]he judgment of 
the Superior Court stands affirmed in accordance with the usual 
practice in such cases and decides this case without becoming a 
precedent.”54 
From 1967 until 1985, whenever the justices were equally 
divided, regardless of whether the case causing the division reached 
the supreme court from a trial court or from the court of appeals, the 
court’s holding was substantially the same.55 The judgment below was 
affirmed “without precedential value in accordance with the usual 
practice in this situation,”56 or simply “without precedential value,”57 
or “without becoming a precedent.”58 Occasionally, the supreme court 
elaborated that, “following the uniform practice of this Court and the 
ancient rule of praesumitur pro negante, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed, not as precedent but as the decision in this 
case.”59 
 
 52. 286 N.C. 331, 210 S.E.2d 260 (1974) (per curiam). 
 53. Id. at 332–33, 210 S.E.2d at 260. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(b), the 
supreme court may certify a cause for review before determination by the court of appeals 
when in the opinion of the Supreme Court: 
 
(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or 
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the 
jurisprudence of the State, or 
(3) Delay in final adjudication is likely to result from failure to certify 
and thereby cause substantial harm, or 
(4) The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that 
the expeditious administration of justice requires certification. 
 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b) (2013).  
 54. Johnson, 286 N.C. at 332–33, 210 S.E.2d at 260. 
 55. Cases from 1967 to 1985 in which the justices were equally divided are collected in 
Appendix II. 
 56. Townsend v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 296 N.C. 246, 249, 249 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1978) 
(per curiam) (affirming the decision of the court of appeals). Townsend was the first case 
decided by an equally divided supreme court in which the phrase “without precedential 
value” appeared. Id. In prior cases, the court typically stated that the decision below was 
affirmed “without becoming a precedent.” See, e.g., Johnson, 286 N.C. at 333, 210 S.E.2d 
at 260. 
 57. Shields v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 300 N.C. 366, 370, 266 S.E.2d 658, 660 
(1980) (per curiam) (affirming the decision of the court of appeals); Greenhill v. Crabtree, 
301 N.C. 520, 522, 271 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1980) (per curiam) (affirming the decision of the 
court of appeals). 
 58. State v. Greene, 298 N.C. 268, 269, 258 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1979) (per curiam) 
(affirming the judgment of the superior court). 
 59. Lynch v. Hazelwood, 312 N.C. 619, 619, 324 S.E.2d 224, 224 (1985) (per curiam). 
Lynch cited a decision from the House of Lords, R. v. Millis, 10 Clark & Fin. 534, 907, 8 
Eng. Rep. 844, 982 (H.L. 1844) (“[T]he votes were equal; that is, two for reversing and two 
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In 1985, in Forbes Homes, Inc. v. Trimpi,60 the familiar formula 
from the recent cases was finally established: 
PER CURIAM . . . . 
Chief Justice Branch took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. The remaining members of this Court 
being equally divided, with three members voting to affirm the 
Court of Appeals and three members to reverse, the decision of 
the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without 
precedential value. See State v. Johnson, 286 N.C. 331, 210 
S.E.2d 260 (1974). 
Affirmed.61 
It is noteworthy that in citing Johnson, which was an appeal from the 
decision of a superior court, the supreme court treated the decision of 
the court of appeals as no different from the judgment of a trial court. 
This was consistent with the then-prevailing view that the court of 
appeals was primarily a court for the correction of errors. Although 
twenty years later the supreme court would come to accept the 
intermediate appellate court as a precedent-setting court,62 it would 
fail to recognize that fact in the formula used to dispose of 
affirmances when the justices were equally divided. 
Since 1985, in a large majority of the cases on review from the 
court of appeals in which the justices were equally divided, the 
supreme court’s holding concluded with the words: “[T]he decision of 
the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without 
precedential value.”63 After Forbes Homes, a report on the “voting” 
 
for affirming. Whereupon, according to the ancient rule in the law, Semper praesumitur 
pro negante [always a presumption in favor of denial], it was determined in the negative. 
Therefore the judgment of the Court below was affirmed . . . .”). See also E.F. Blankenship 
Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 318 N.C. 685, 685, 351 S.E.2d 293, 293 (1987) (per curiam) 
(using same language as Millis); State v. Moore, 317 N.C. 144, 144, 343 S.E.2d 430, 430 
(1986) (per curiam) (same). 
 60. 313 N.C. 168, 326 S.E.2d 30 (1985) (per curiam). 
 61. Id. at 169, 326 S.E.2d at 30. The difference in the dispositive language between 
Forbes and the latest case is slight. Compare State v. Franklin, 367 N.C. 183, 183, 752 
S.E.2d 143, 143 (2013) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members voting to reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals.”), with Forbes Homes, 313 N.C. at 169, 326 S.E.2d at 30 
(“The remaining members of this Court being equally divided, with three members voting 
to affirm the Court of Appeals and three members to reverse.”). 
 62. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). 
 63. See infra Appendix III (collecting cases from 1985 to 2013 in which the justices 
were equally divided). 
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became part of the formula,64 in addition to the statement that the 
justices were equally divided. In only a few cases since Forbes Homes 
were the voters on each side of the divide named,65 and rarely since 
Forbes Homes did the voters publish separate opinions, as had 
occurred early in the twentieth century.66 Only occasionally did the 
court expressly state the issue on which the justices were divided,67 as 
had occurred previously.68 
 
 64. In Miller v. Bank of Washington, 176 N.C. 152, 96 S.E. 977 (1918), another case in 
which the justices were equally divided, Chief Justice Clark cited the Income Tax Case, 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), which he described in terms of 
how the justices “voted.” 176 N.C. at 160, 96 S.E. at 981. “Voting” as a description of 
judicial decision making by an equally divided North Carolina Supreme Court first 
appeared in In re Willis, 286 N.C. 207, 208, 209 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1974) (per curiam) 
(affirming the judgment of the superior court), but did not become a part of the formula 
generally, although not invariably, used to describe an equally divided court until after 
Forbes Homes in 1985. See infra Appendix III (collecting cases from 1985 to 2013).  
 65. See Reese v. Barbee, 350 N.C. 60, 60, 510 S.E.2d 374, 374 (1999) (per curiam) 
(“Chief Justice Mitchell and Associate Justices Parker and Wainwright voted to affirm and 
Associate Justices Frye, Lake, and Orr voted to reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals.”); Roman v. Southland Transp. Co., 350 N.C. 549, 555, 515 S.E.2d 214, 218 
(1999) (“With Chief Justice Mitchell and Justices Lake and Wainwright voting to affirm 
and Justices Frye, Parker and Orr voting to reverse . . . .”); Couch v. Private Diagnostic 
Clinic, 351 N.C. 92, 93, 520 S.E.2d 785, 785 (1999) (per curiam) (“Justices Lake, Martin, 
and Wainwright . . . would vote to grant a new trial. Chief Justice Frye and Justices Parker 
and Orr . . . would vote to affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals.”). Although 
deprived of precedential value, the decisions of the court of appeals in these cases remain 
res judicata and the law of the case, binding subsequent proceedings. Reese v. Barbee, 134 
N.C. App. 728, 730, 518 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1999). 
 66. Roman, 350 N.C. at 555, 515 S.E.2d at 218; Hearne v. Sherman, 350 N.C. 612, 617, 
516 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1999). In Miller v. Bank of Washington, Chief Justice Clark defended 
the filing of opinions when the members of the supreme court were equally divided against 
Justices Walker and Allen, who thought “no opinions should have been filed in this case 
because the Court was evenly divided as to what the decision should be . . . .” 176 N.C. at 
170, 96 S.E. at 985. For the confusion that can be caused by opinions filed in a case 
affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, see Enoch v. Alamance Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 164 N.C. App. 223, 249, 595 S.E.2d 744, 756 (2004) (citing opinion of one justice in 
Hearne v. Sherman, 350 N.C. 612, 515 S.E.2d 864 (1999), a case in which the justices were 
equally divided). 
  The Justices of the United States Supreme Court are also divided on the propriety 
of filing opinions when they are equally divided. Compare Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 
Pet.) 540, 561 (1840) (Taney, C.J.) (“The members of the Court, after the fullest 
discussions, are so divided that no opinion can be delivered as the opinion of the Court. It 
is, however, deemed advisable, in order to prevent mistakes or misconstruction, to state 
the opinions we have respectively formed.”), with Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 
264 (1960) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.) (“The usual practice of not expressing opinions 
upon an equal division has the salutary force of preventing the identification of the 
Justices holding the differing views as to the issue, and this may well enable the next case 
presenting it to be approached with less commitment.”). 
 67. Williams v. Vonderau, 362 N.C. 76, 76, 653 S.E.2d 144, 144 (2007) (per curiam) 
(“On the issue of whether more than one incident of harassment is required before a trial 
court can enter a civil no-contact order under N.C.G.S. 50C-1(6), the members of the 
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For almost a century, from the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s decision in Durham in 1893 until the creation of the court 
of appeals in 1967, appeals from a superior court decided by an 
equally divided supreme court were announced in similar language, 
often: “[T]he judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in accord 
with the usual practice in such cases, and stands as the decision in this 
case without becoming a precedent.”69 After 1967, the wording in 
such cases continued to deny that affirmance of the judgment below 
created a precedent, whether that judgment was rendered by a 
superior court or by the court of appeals. After 1985, the formula 
used in Forbes Homes—“is left undisturbed and stands without 
precedential value”70—became standard. In the twenty-first century, 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina continued to repeat it almost 
without exception.71 Although the words remained essentially 
 
Court are equally divided . . . .”); Ripellino v. N.C. School Bds. Ass’n, 361 N.C. 214, 215, 
639 S.E.2d 441, 442 (2007) (per curiam) (“As to the appeal of right based on the dissenting 
opinion, the members of the Court are equally divided.”); Couch, 351 N.C. at 93, 520 
S.E.2d at 785 (“Justices Lake, Martin, and Wainwright believe that the error was 
prejudicial to the appealing defendant . . . Chief Justice Frye and Justices Parker and Orr 
are of the opinion that the error was not prejudicial to the appealing defendant . . . .”). 
 68. See, e.g., Greenhill v. Crabtree, 301 N.C. 520, 522, 271 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1980) (per 
curiam) (“The remaining six justices are equally divided as to whether Judge McKinnon 
erred in denying plaintiff’s motion to set aside the notice of dismissal . . . ‘for the reason 
that said dismissal was filed without any authority, express or implied, from the plaintiff, 
or anyone representing the plaintiff.’ ”) (internal citations omitted); Shields v. Bobby 
Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 300 N.C. 366, 370, 266 S.E.2d 658, 660 (1980) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining six justices are equally divided as to whether the defendant’s evidence when 
considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff shows as a matter of law that there 
has been no violation of G.S. 25-9-504 or G.S. 75-1.1.”). See also State v. Greene, 298 N.C. 
268, 269, 258 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1979) (per curiam); Starr v. Clapp, 298 N.C. 275, 277, 258 
S.E.2d 348, 350 (1979) (per curiam); Wachovia Mortg. Co. v. Autry-Barker-Spurrier Real 
Estate, Inc., 297 N.C. 696, 697, 256 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1979) (per curiam); State v. Oxner, 297 
N.C. 44, 46, 252 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1979) (per curiam); Townsend v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 296 
N.C. 246, 249, 249 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1978) (per curiam). 
 69. Pafford v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 218 N.C. 782, 783, 11 S.E.2d 548, 549 (1940) 
(per curiam). 
 70. Forbes Homes, Inc. v. Trimpi, 313 N.C. 168, 169, 326 S.E.2d 30, 30 (1985) (per 
curiam). 
 71. But see John Conner Constr., Inc. v. Grandfather Holding Co., 366 N.C. 547, 547, 
742 S.E.2d 802, 802 (2013) (per curiam) (“[T]he decision of the Court of Appeals stands 
without precedential value.”); Williams, 362 N.C. at 76, 653 S.E.2d at 145 (“[T]he decision 
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed without precedential value.”); Ripellino, 361 N.C. at 
215, 639 S.E.2d at 442 (“[T]hose portions of the Court of Appeals opinion [on which the 
justices are equally divided] are affirmed without precedential value.”) (employing slightly 
different language). When the justices of the supreme court are equally divided 
concerning interlocutory appeals of lower court orders, the orders are affirmed without 
mention of their precedential value. See, e.g., Tyndall v. Ford Motor Co., 367 N.C. 161, 
162, 749 S.E.2d 279, 279 (2013) (per curiam) (“[T]he orders of the Court of Appeals are 
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unchanged for more than one hundred years, the context in which 
they were used changed with the creation of the intermediate 
appellate court. 
II.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
At the polls on November 2, 1965, the voters of North Carolina 
ratified a constitutional amendment that created the Appellate 
Division of the General Court of Justice, consisting of the supreme 
court and the court of appeals,72 and on January 1, 1967, the 
intermediate appellate court began to function.73 For the first two 
years of its existence, the court of appeals operated with six judges;74 
in 1969 the number of judges increased to nine.75 In 1977 the 
membership of the court was increased to twelve judges,76 and in 2000 
to fifteen.77 Although the court of appeals has at some periods 
consisted of an even number of judges, an equal division of the judges 
is impossible because the court of appeals sits in panels of three 
judges each, assigned by the chief judge.78 
 
left undisturbed.”); State v. Long, 365 N.C. 5, 5, 705 S.E.2d 735, 735 (2011) (per curiam) 
(“[T]he order of the superior court is affirmed.”). 
 72. See AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1776–96, at 14 
(comp. by John L. Sanders & John F. Lomax, Jr., 1997). After the revision of the North 
Carolina Constitution approved by the voters on November 3, 1970 (effective January 1, 
1971), the provision appears in article IV, section 5. See ORTH & NEWBY, supra note 19, at 
131.  
 73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (2013) (“The Court of Appeals is created effective 
January 1, 1967.”). 
 74. Id. (“The Court of Appeals . . . shall consist initially of six judges . . . .”). 
 75. Id. (“Effective January 1, 1969, the number of judges is increased to nine . . . .”). 
 76. Id. (“Effective January 1, 1977, the number of judges is increased to 12 . . . .”). For 
the early history of the court of appeals, see DAVID M. BRITT, COURT OF APPEALS OF 
NORTH CAROLINA: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, 1967–1992 (1992). 
 77. § 7A-16 (“On or after December 15, 2000, the Governor shall appoint three 
additional judges to increase the number of judges to 15.”). In general, the North Carolina 
Constitution distinguishes justices of the supreme court from judges of the court of 
appeals. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. IV, §§ 6, 8, 16, 17, 22. Oddly, article IV, section 21, 
prohibiting diminishment of judicial salaries, mentions only “Judges.” N.C. CONST. art. 
IV, § 21. 
 78. § 7A-16. The members of each panel are assigned “in such fashion that each 
member sits a substantially equal number of times with each other member.” Id. The 
rotation of the judges was intended “to prevent the growth of diverging bodies of case law 
among various panels of fixed membership.” STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM’N, REPORT 
OF THE COURTS COMMISSION TO THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7 (1967). 
Divergent bodies of case law became theoretically impossible after In re Appeal from Civil 
Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36–37 (1989) (holding that court of appeals 
decisions have precedential value)—except when a decision of one panel is affirmed by an 
equally divided supreme court and left “without precedential value.” See Williams v. 
Vonderau, 362 N.C. 76, 76, 653 S.E.2d 144, 145 (2007). 
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The motive for creating an intermediate appellate court in the 
1960s was to ease the heavy caseload of the state supreme court, 
which had been made even heavier by contemporary criminal justice 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court that greatly increased 
post-conviction appeals.79 For advice on creating the new court, the 
general assembly established the North Carolina Courts Commission 
(“the Commission”) by joint resolution in 1963 and specified that it 
would begin reporting to the general assembly in 1965.80 In its analysis 
of the problem caused by the overcrowded docket, the Commission 
began with the fact that the functions of appellate courts in general 
are two-fold: 
First, they correct error committed at the trial level which is 
prejudicial to a litigant, i.e., they attempt to insure justice in the 
individual case. Second, they develop the jurisprudence of the 
state through their reported decisions, i.e., they serve the 
precedential function of the common law system by declaring, 
expanding, and clarifying the case law of the state.81 
In allocating these functions between the two appellate courts in the 
General Court of Justice, the Commission recommended that “those 
cases having this added dimension of general jurisprudential 
significance,” whether decisions of a trial court or of the court of 
appeals, should be reviewed by the supreme court, while “those cases 
which, in great numbers, do not have this added dimension” should 
be finally decided by the court of appeals.82 
Since the creation of the court of appeals in 1967, there has been 
an appeal of right from the court of appeals to the supreme court in 
any case that “directly involves a substantial question arising under 
the Constitution of the United States or of this State”83 or “in which 
 
 79. STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 78, at 2. For a survey of the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court that increased appeals to the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina, see A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 
67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 260–64 (1968). For a retrospective overview, see MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 91–98 (1998). 
 80. See S.J. Res. 73, 1963 Gen. Assemb., 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 1815. The Courts 
Commission was composed of fifteen members, at least eight of whom were members or 
former members of the general assembly, appointed jointly by the governor, the speaker 
of the house of representatives, and the chairmen of the house and senate judiciary 
committees. Id. The terms of the Commissioners expired in 1970. Id. 
 81. STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 78, at 12. 
 82. Id. at 13. 
 83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (2013). The constitutional question “must be real and 
substantial rather than superficial and frivolous. It must be a constitutional question which 
has not already been the subject of conclusive judicial determination.” State v. Colson, 274 
N.C. 295, 305, 163 S.E.2d 376, 383 (1968). 
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there is a dissent.”84 In its discretion, the supreme court may also 
certify a cause for review after a decision by the court of appeals,85 or 
directly from the trial court before a decision by the court of 
appeals.86 In a few cases, there is an appeal of right from a trial court 
directly to the supreme court.87 
From the beginning, the distinction between the error-correcting 
and the precedent-setting functions of the court of appeals was 
difficult to maintain. As the Commission itself recognized: “These 
two functions of course are frequently carried on simultaneously. In 
many cases the general law is clarified or expanded in the very 
process of correcting trial court error in the individual case.”88 The 
potential for confusion between these functions was only increased by 
the recommendation of the Commission that the court of appeals 
should print its opinions “in the same manner as the Supreme 
Court.”89 Reported decisions are, as the Commission elsewhere 
 
 84. § 7A-30; see also N.C. R. APP. P. 16(b) (placing restrictions on the supreme court’s 
review of court of appeals cases when the appeal is based solely upon the existence of a 
dissenting opinion at the appellate level); Thomas L. Fowler, Appellate Rule 16(b): The 
Scope of Review in an Appeal Based Solely upon a Dissent in the Court of Appeals, 24 N.C. 
CENT. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2001) (explaining how the right to appeal on the grounds that there 
is a dissent furthers the purposes of the two-tier court system).  
 85. Certification after determination by the court of appeals may be allowed when in 
the opinion of the Supreme Court: 
 
(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or 
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the 
jurisprudence of the State, or 
(3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in 
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court. 
 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c) (2013).  
 86. Certification before determination by the court of appeals may be allowed when 
in the opinion of the supreme court: 
 
(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or 
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the 
jurisprudence of the State, or 
(3) Delay in final adjudication is likely to result from failure to certify 
and thereby cause substantial harm, or 
(4) The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that 
the expeditious administration of justice requires certification. 
 
Id. § 7A-31(b).  
 87. Id. § 7A-27(a)(1) (Supp. 2014) (sentences of death); id. § (a)(3) (certain decisions 
of the business court); id. § (a)(1) (decisions holding a state statute “facially invalid” for 
violation of the North Carolina Constitution or federal law). 
 88. STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 78, at 12. 
 89. Id. at 10. 
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recognized, normally the means by which appellate courts develop 
“the jurisprudence of the state,” rather than merely correct error.90 
Despite the printed opinions—and the recognition that 
precedents could be established as errors were corrected—the court 
of appeals was not originally expected to play a major role in 
developing North Carolina case law.91 From this perspective, it was 
only natural for the supreme court to continue to use the form of 
words that it had developed to decide appeals from a trial court in 
cases in which the justices were equally divided. Parrish reached the 
supreme court on appeal from a superior court in 1967, the same year 
that the court of appeals first began to function.92 Equally divided, the 
supreme court announced the result using language that stretched 
back to Justice Clark’s decision in Durham.93 The next time the 
justices were equally divided, in Sharpe,94 the case was on review from 
a decision of the court of appeals. Within a month of deciding Sharpe, 
the court decided Johnson,95 an appeal from a superior court. The 
decisions in Sharpe and Johnson were announced using similar 
language, both citing Parrish, without regard to whether the supreme 
court was reviewing a judgment of a superior court or a decision of 
the court of appeals.96 Thereafter, Johnson was frequently cited when 
the justices were equally divided.97 
Yet even as the supreme court continued to repeat that a 
decision of the court of appeals affirmed by an equally divided 
supreme court was of no more precedential value than the decision of 
a trial court, the supreme court was growing increasingly comfortable 
with the court of appeals as a court that developed “the jurisprudence 
 
 90. Id. at 12. 
 91. Id. at 13. 
 92. 271 N.C. 711, 157 S.E.2d 334 (1967) (per curiam). 
 93. Town of Durham v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 113 N.C. 240, 240, 18 S.E. 
208, 208 (1893) (“[T]he judgment below stands, not as a precedent, but as the decision in 
this case.”). 
 94. Sharpe v. Pugh, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974) (per curiam). 
 95. State v. Johnson, 286 N.C. 331, 210 S.E.2d 260 (1974) (per curiam). 
 96. See Sharpe, 286 N.C. at 210, 209 S.E.2d at 457; Johnson, 286 N.C. at 333, 210 
S.E.2d at 260. 
 97. Cases that cite Johnson on appeal from a judgment of a trial court include: State v. 
Long, 365 N.C. 5, 5, 705 S.E.2d 735, 735 (2011) (per curiam); State v. Greene, 298 N.C. 
268, 269, 258 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1979) (per curiam). Cases that cite Johnson on review by 
appeal or certification from a decision of the court of appeals include: Kempson v. N.C. 
Dep’t of Human Res., 328 N.C. 722, 723, 403 S.E.2d 279, 279 (1991) (per curiam); 
Hochheiser v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 321 N.C. 117, 117, 361 S.E.2d 562, 562 (1987) (per 
curiam); Shields v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 300 N.C. 366, 370, 266 S.E.2d 658, 660 
(1980) (per curiam); Townsend v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 296 N.C. 246, 249, 249 S.E.2d 801, 
802 (1978) (per curiam). 
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of the state.”98 In 1989, it expressly recognized the precedent-setting 
function of the court of appeals. In In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 
the supreme court held: “Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel 
of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been 
overturned by a higher court.”99 
The relatively recent emergence of the court of appeals as a 
precedent-setting court indicates the need to reconsider the effect of a 
decision by the supreme court when the justices are equally divided. 
Of course, affirmance by an equally divided supreme court, whether 
of a judgment of a superior court or of a decision of the court of 
appeals, creates no supreme court precedent. In this way, it differs 
from any other affirmance by the high court. As Chief Justice 
Marshall explained in Etting, the 1826 United States Supreme Court 
case cited in Durham: “[T]he principles of law which have been 
argued cannot be settled”100—settled, that is, by the Supreme Court. 
But a court of appeals decision affirmed by an equally divided 
supreme court could be allowed to have precedential value—to the 
same extent as any other decision of the court of appeals. In Durant, 
another case cited in Durham, Justice Field, writing in 1868 for the 
United States Supreme Court, described the entry of a judgment of 
affirmance by an equally divided court as “only the most convenient 
mode of expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in 
conformity with the action of the court below, and that that court can 
proceed to enforce its judgment”101—that is, that the decision is res 
 
 98. STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 78, at 12.  
 99. 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). Decisions of a panel of the court of 
appeals may remain final statements of North Carolina law because of the interaction of 
this rule with section 7A-30 of the North Carolina General Statutes. N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 7A-30 (2013) (providing right of review by the supreme court only if the case “directly 
involves a constitutional question” or if “there is a dissent”). Any plaintiff thereafter 
raising the same issue decided by a prior panel of the court of appeals should expect to 
lose in the trial court and in the court of appeals. Moreover, the decision of the panel of 
the court of appeals in the subsequent case should be unanimous, meaning that only if a 
petition for discretionary review is granted will the plaintiff have the opportunity to 
present the issue to the supreme court. Id. § 7A-31 (providing discretionary review by the 
supreme court only if the case is of “significant public interest,” “involves legal principles 
of major significance,” or “if the decision of the Court of Appeals appears to be in conflict 
with a decision of the Supreme Court”). Few plaintiffs will be likely to bear the cost in 
time and expense in the hopes of having that opportunity. 
 100. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 59, 78 (1826). 
 101. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1868). For a scholarly note on the effect of a decision 
by an equally divided court, see the observations of the reporter H.B. Wallace. 7 Wall. at 
755 (“A judgment affirmed by a divided court binds inferior courts, and of course is a 
precedent in the court in which it was entered.”). 
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judicata. He added, citing Etting: “The legal effect would be the same 
if the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed,”102 implicitly indicating 
that the lower court’s decision would have whatever precedential 
effect it would have had, had it not been appealed. When Justice 
Clark said in Durham that the judgment of the superior court “stands, 
not as a precedent, but as the decision in this case,”103 he was simply 
recognizing the fact that trial courts are not precedent-setting courts. 
Recognizing the precedential value of decisions of the court of 
appeals in cases in which the justices are equally divided would not 
lead to geographical variations104 because the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals does not operate in territorial units.105 But continuing to 
deny precedential value to decisions of the court of appeals affirmed 
by an equally divided supreme court does create jurisprudential 
dilemmas. Like cases may not be decided alike, violating a 
fundamental principle of due process.106 In addition, inconsistent 
results can erode public confidence that the courts are administering 
equal justice under law.107 Different results in similar criminal cases 
would be particularly troubling, since a final decision by a panel of the 
court of appeals affirmed by an equally divided supreme court would 
not be binding in a different case raising the same issue decided by a 
subsequent panel of the same court. In such a situation, it would be 
possible for one defendant to go free while another was convicted.108 
 
 102. Durant, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 112. 
 103. 113 N.C. 240, 18 S.E. 208 (1893). Justice Clark cited a subsequent proceeding in 
Durant, the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Durant v. Essex Co., 90 
Mass. (8 Allen) 103 (1864) (citing Etting, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 59 (1826)). 
 104. Cf. William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme 
Court: History, Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 32 (1983) (observing that a 
United States court of appeals decision affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court 
“has no binding effect in other circuits” and that “equal divisions can prolong a 
geographical inconsistency . . . .”). 
 105. The Commission had expressly recommended against “dividing the State into a 
number of geographic divisions, over each of which a panel of the Court of Appeals would 
have exclusive control in appellate matters.” STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 
78, at 8. 
 106. See JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 1–14 (2003). 
 107. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014) (“Stare 
decisis, we have stated, ‘is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial 
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991). Although 
‘not an inexorable command,’ id. at 828, stare decisis is a foundation stone of the rule of 
law, necessary to ensure that legal rules develop ‘in a principled and intelligible fashion,’ 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).”).  
 108. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14–19 (6th 
ed. 2012) (discussing theories of criminal punishment); ORTH, supra note 106, at 1–14 
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Where a decision of a prior panel is affirmed by an equally 
divided supreme court, a subsequent panel confronting the same issue 
is free to reach a contrary result. In Hardin v. KCS International, 
Inc.,109 for example, a unanimous panel of the court of appeals 
declined to follow a prior panel’s decision affirmed by an equally 
divided supreme court, stating: “[W]e do not find [it] persuasive on 
this issue.”110 On the other hand, a subsequent panel confronting the 
same issue decided by a prior panel that was affirmed by an equally 
divided supreme court may reach the same result. In Lord v. 
Beerman,111 a unanimous panel, while recognizing that it was not 
bound by the prior decision, nonetheless found it to be “persuasive 
authority” and followed it.112 Since neither Hardin nor Lord was 
subsequently reviewed by the supreme court, they do have 
precedential value, binding on subsequent panels of the court of 
appeals. Had the prior, reviewed decisions been allowed the same 
value as unreviewed decisions, inconsistent results would have been 
avoided and all final decisions of the court of appeals would have the 
same precedential value until reversed by a higher court. 
CONCLUSION 
Now that the court of appeals is a precedent-setting part of the 
Appellate Division of the General Court of Justice, there is no reason 
to continue to treat a decision of the court of appeals as if it were the 
judgment of a trial court. When the justices of the supreme court are 
 
(detailing how unequal convictions conflict with principles of punishment and notions of 
due process). 
 109. 199 N.C. App. 687, 682 S.E.2d 726 (2009). 
 110. Id. at 694, 682 S.E.2d at 732 (rejecting the decision in Currituck Assocs. v. 
Hollowell, 166 N.C. App. 17, 601 S.E.2d 256 (2004), aff’d by an equally divided supreme 
court, 360 N.C. 160, 622 S.E.2d 493 (2005) (per curiam)); see also Daniels v. Durham Cnty. 
Hosp. Corp., 171 N.C. App. 535, 540–41, 615 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2005) (rejecting the decision in 
Campbell v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 84 N.C. App. 314, 352 S.E.2d 902 (1987), aff’d by 
an equally divided supreme court, 321 N.C. 260, 362 S.E.2d 273 (1987)) (“[T]he North 
Carolina Supreme Court was evenly divided and accordingly affirmed the Campbell 
opinion, but stripped it of precedential value.”), discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 289, 
628 S.E.2d 247 (2006); Elliot v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 115 N.C. App. 613, 620, 446 
S.E.2d 809, 813 (1994) (rejecting the decision in Kempson v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 
100 N.C. App. 482, 397 S.E.2d 314 (1990), aff’d by an equally divided Supreme Court, 328 
N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 (1991)) (“We must . . . analyze this question without regard to 
this Court’s decision in Kempson.”), aff’d per curiam, 341 N.C 191, 459 S.E.2d 273 (1995). 
 111. 191 N.C. App. 290, 664 S.E.2d 331 (2008). 
 112. Id. at 296 n.3, 664 S.E.2d at 336 n.3 (reaching the same result as in Sharpe v. Pugh, 
21 N.C. App. 110, 203 S.E.2d 330, aff’d by an equally divided supreme court, 286 N.C. 209, 
209 S.E.2d 456 (1974) (per curiam), and rejecting defendants’ citation of Sharpe as 
“controlling authority” but noting that it “may be persuasive authority in this case . . .”). 
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unable to decide a case on review from the court of appeals because 
they are equally divided, the decision of the court of appeals should 
be left undisturbed and stand as the decision in this case. Period. 
APPENDIX I.  NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT CASES IN WHICH 
THE JUSTICES WERE EQUALLY DIVIDED: 1893 TO 1967 
Town of Durham v. Richmond & Danville Railroad Co., 113 
N.C. 240, 240–41, 18 S.E. 208, 208 (1893) (“[T]he court is evenly 
divided . . . . Under these circumstances, following the uniform 
practice of appellate courts in such cases, the judgment below stands, 
not as a precedent, but as the decision in this case.”). 
Puryear v. Lynch, 121 N.C. 255, 256, 28 S.E. 410, 410 (1897) (per 
curiam) (“[T]he Court is evenly divided. The practice of appellate 
courts in such cases is that the judgment below stands, not as a 
precedent, but as the decision in the case.”). 
Morehead Banking Co. v. City of Burlington, 124 N.C. 251, 251–
52, 32 S.E. 558, 558 (1899) (per curiam) (“[T]he Court is evenly 
divided. According to the settled practice of appellate courts in such 
cases, the judgment below stands, not as a precedent, but as the 
decision in this case.”). 
Boone v. Peebles, 126 N.C. 824, 825, 36 S.E. 193, 195 (1900) 
(“[T]he other members of the Court being equally divided . . . the 
opinion of the court below must prevail . . . .”). 
Ward v. Odell Manufacturing Co., 126 N.C. 946, 946, 36 S.E. 
194, 194 (1900) (“[T]he Court being equally divided, the judgment 
below is affirmed.”). 
Miller v. Bank of Washington, 176 N.C. 152, 161, 96 S.E. 977, 
981 (1918) (“The Court being evenly divided, the judgment of the 
Court below is affirmed.”). 
Jenkins v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 187 N.C. 864, 864, 123 S.E. 82, 
82 (1924) (“[T]he Court is evenly divided in opinion. Following the 
uniform practice of appellate courts in such cases, the judgment of the 
lower court is affirmed and stands, not as a precedent, but as the 
decision in this case.”). 
McCarter v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Railway Co., 187 
N.C. 863, 864, 123 S.E. 88, 88 (1924) (“The Court being evenly 
divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, and 
stands as the decision in this case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Town of Hillsboro v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 191 N.C. 828, 
828, 132 S.E. 657, 657 (1926) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly 
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divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the court below is affirmed and 
stands as the decision in this case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Raynor v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 193 N.C. 385, 
385, 137 S.E. 137, 137 (1927) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly 
divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the lower court is affirmed and 
stands, according to the uniform practice of appellate courts, as the 
decision in this case, but without becoming a precedent.”). 
Lawrence v. Fidelity Bank, 193 N.C. 841, 841, 137 S.E. 427, 427 
(1927) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in 
opinion . . . the ruling of the lower court is affirmed and stands, 
according to the uniform practice of appellate courts, as the decision 
in this case, without becoming a precedent for the future.”). 
Gooch v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 196 N.C. 823, 824, 146 
S.E. 803, 803 (1929) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed and stands 
as the decision in this case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Town of Tarboro v. Johnson, 196 N.C. 824, 824, 146 S.E. 803, 
803 (1929) (per curiam) (“[T]he Court being evenly divided in 
opinion, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, and stands as 
the decision in this case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Parsons v. Board of Education, 200 N.C. 88, 89, 156 S.E. 244, 
244 (1930) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed and stands 
as the decision of this case, without becoming a precedent.”). 
Durham v. Lloyd, 200 N.C. 803, 803, 157 S.E. 136, 136 (1931) 
(per curiam) (“The court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the 
judgment is affirmed, in accordance with the practice in this Court. 
This decision disposes of the appeal, without becoming a 
precedent.”). 
Hunter Manufacturing & Commission Co. v. Leak 
Manufacturing Co., 201 N.C. 823, 824, 159 S.E. 411, 411 (1931) (per 
curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment 
of the Superior Court is affirmed and stands as the decision in this 
particular case, without becoming a precedent for the future.”). 
Nebel v. Nebel, 201 N.C. 840, 840, 161 S.E. 223, 223 (1931) (per 
curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment 
of the Superior Court is affirmed and stands as the decision of this 
action, without becoming a precedent.”). 
First National Bank & Trust Co., v. Hood ex rel Central Bank 
& Trust Co., 207 N.C. 862, 863, 177 S.E. 16, 16 (1934) (per curiam) 
(“The Court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the 
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Superior Court is affirmed, and stands as the decision in this 
proceeding, without becoming a precedent.”). 
Seay v. Sentinel Life Insurance Co., 208 N.C. 832, 833, 179 S.E. 
888, 889 (1935) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed and stands, 
according to the uniform practice of appellate courts, as the decision 
in this case, without becoming a precedent.”). 
Sondey v. Yates, 208 N.C. 836, 836, 181 S.E. 326, 326 (1935) (per 
curiam) (“The Court being equally divided in opinion . . . the 
judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed in accordance with the 
usual practice in such cases, and stand as the decisions in these cases 
without becoming precedents.”). 
Smith v. Powell, 208 N.C. 837, 837, 181 S.E. 325, 325–26 (1935) 
(per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the 
judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in accordance with the 
usual practice of appellate courts, and stands as the decision in this 
case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Martin v. Southern Railway Co., 208 N.C. 843, 843, 181 S.E. 745, 
746 (1935) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, as the 
disposition of this appeal, without becoming a precedent, in 
accordance with the practice of the Court.”). 
Joyner v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 208 N.C. 843, 
844, 182 S.E. 111, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (“The Court being equally 
divided in opinion . . . the order of the Superior Court is affirmed in 
accordance with the usual practice in such cases, and stands as a 
decision in this case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Sessoms v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 208 N.C. 844, 845, 
182 S.E. 112, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (“The Court being equally 
divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed 
in accordance with the usual practice in such cases, and stands as the 
decision in this case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Hayes v. City of Hickory, 208 N.C. 845, 845, 182 S.E. 111, 111 
(1935) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, and stands 
as the decision in this case without becoming a precedent.”). 
State v. Swan, 209 N.C. 836, 837, 183 S.E. 285, 286 (1936) (per 
curiam) (“In accord with the established practice, the court being 
evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is 
affirmed, and stands as the decision in this case without becoming a 
precedent.”). 
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Holderfield v. Pou, 209 N.C. 844, 844, 183 S.E. 373, 373 (1936) 
(per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the 
judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed and stands as the decision 
in this action without becoming a precedent.”). 
Brown v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 
210 N.C. 825, 825, 185 S.E. 429, 429 (1936) (per curiam) (“The Court 
being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior 
Court is affirmed and stands as the decision in this case, without 
becoming a precedent.”). 
Ferrell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 210 N.C. 831, 831, 
187 S.E. 575, 575 (1936) (per curiam) (“The Court being equally 
divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed 
in accordance with the usual practice in such cases, and stands as the 
decision in the instant case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Gott v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 210 N.C. 832, 832, 
187 S.E. 572, 573 (1936) (per curiam) (“The Court being equally 
divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed 
and stands as the decision in this case, without becoming a 
precedent.”). 
Cole v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 211 N.C. 591, 599, 191 
S.E. 353, 358 (1937) (“One member of the Court . . . being absent, and 
the remaining four being equally divided in opinion . . . the judgment 
of the Superior Court, accordant with the usual practice in such cases, 
is affirmed and stands as the decision in the instant case, without 
becoming a precedent.”). 
Jackson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 211 N.C. 733, 733–34, 
189 S.E. 763, 764 (1937) (per curiam) (“One member of the 
Court . . . being absent, and the remaining four being equally divided 
in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court, accordant with the 
usual practice in such cases, is affirmed and stands as the decision in 
this case, without becoming a precedent.”). 
Allen v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 211 N.C. 736, 737, 190 S.E. 
735, 735 (1937) (per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . being 
absent, and the remaining four being equally divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court, accordant with the 
usual practice in such cases, is affirmed and stands as the decision in 
this case, without becoming a precedent.”). 
Virginia Trust Co. v. Merrick, 211 N.C. 739, 740, 191 S.E. 5, 6 
(1937) (per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . the remaining 
four being equally divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior 
Court, in accord with the usual practice in such cases, is affirmed and 
stands as the decision of this case, without becoming a precedent.”). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1719 (2015) 
2015] WITHOUT PRECEDENTIAL VALUE 1743 
Collins v. Security Mutual Life Insurance Co., 213 N.C. 800, 
800, 195 S.E. 793, 793 (1938) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly 
divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, 
as the disposition of this appeal, without becoming a precedent, in 
accord with the practice of the Court.”). 
Mills v. Jones, 213 N.C. 802, 802, 196 S.E. 308, 308 (1938) (per 
curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment 
of the Superior Court is affirmed, as the disposition of this appeal, 
without becoming a precedent, in accord with the practice of the 
Court.”). 
Johnston v. Halifax Paper Co., 214 N.C. 828, 829, 199 S.E. 20, 20 
(1938) (per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . not sitting, and 
the remaining six being equally divided in opinion . . . the judgment of 
the Superior Court is affirmed in accordance with the usual practice 
in such cases, and stands as the decision in the present case, without 
becoming a precedent.”). 
Outlaw v. City of Asheville, 215 N.C. 790, 790, 1 S.E.2d 559, 560 
(1939) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed as the 
disposition of this appeal without becoming a precedent in 
accordance with the practice of the Court.”). 
Toxey v. Meggs, 216 N.C. 798, 798, 4 S.E.2d 513, 513 (1939) (per 
curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . not sitting, and the remaining 
six being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior 
Court is affirmed, accordant with the usual practice in such cases, and 
stands as the decision in the instant case, without becoming a 
precedent.”). 
Howard v. Queen City Coach Co., 216 N.C. 799, 800, 4 S.E.2d 
616, 616 (1939) (per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . not 
sitting, and the remaining six being evenly divided in opinion . . . the 
judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, accordant with the usual 
practice in such cases, and stands as the decision in the instant case, 
without becoming a precedent.”). 
Pafford v. J. A. Jones Construction Co., 218 N.C. 782, 783, 11 
S.E.2d 548, 549 (1940) (per curiam) (“One member of the 
Court . . . not sitting, and the remaining six being evenly divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in accord 
with the usual practice in such cases, and stands as the decision in this 
case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Elmore v. General Amusements, 221 N.C. 535, 536, 19 S.E.2d 5, 5 
(1942) (per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . not sitting, and 
the remaining six being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of 
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the Superior Court stands affirmed as the disposition of this appeal 
without becoming a precedent, accordant with the usual practice in 
such cases.”). 
Smith v. McDowell Furniture Co., 221 N.C. 536, 536–37, 19 
S.E.2d 17, 18 (1942) (per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . not 
sitting, and the remaining six being evenly divided in opinion, the 
judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in accord with the usual 
practice in such cases, and stands as the decision in this case without 
becoming a precedent.”). 
Whitehead v. City of Charlotte, 221 N.C. 539, 540, 20 S.E.2d 57, 
57–58 (1942) (per curiam) (“Upon consideration of the appeal the 
Court was evenly divided—three to three . . . . Therefore, the 
judgment of the court below stands affirmed, and this decision does 
not become a precedent.”). 
Suiter v. Swift & Co. Fertilizer Works, 221 N.C. 541, 542, 20 
S.E.2d 293, 294 (1942) (per curiam) (“Upon the hearing of the matter, 
the Court divided three to three . . . . Under the Rule of Court, the 
judgment of the court below stands affirmed, and this decision does 
not become a precedent.”). 
Wells v. Wells, 222 N.C. 748, 748, 21 S.E.2d 832, 832 (1942) (per 
curiam) (“The Court being equally divided in opinion . . . the 
judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed as the disposition of this 
appeal without becoming a precedent, in accord with the practice of 
the Court.”). 
Gardner v. McDonald, 223 N.C. 854, 855, 25 S.E.2d 397, 397 
(1943) (per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . not sitting, and 
the remaining six being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of 
the Superior Court stands affirmed as the disposition of this appeal, 
without becoming a precedent, accordant with the usual practice in 
such cases.”). 
Gardner v. McDonald, 223 N.C. 555, 555, 27 S.E.2d 522, 522 
(1943) (“On original appeal, one member of the Court not sitting, and 
the remaining six being evenly divided in opinion . . . the ruling stood 
affirmed as to the disposition of the appeal without becoming a 
precedent.”). 
Bullard v. Hotel Holding Co., 225 N.C. 766, 766–67, 33 S.E.2d 
480, 480 (1945) (per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . not 
sitting, and the remaining six being evenly divided in opinion . . . the 
judgment of Superior Court is affirmed, according to usual practice of 
the Court in such cases, and stands as the decision in this case—
without becoming a precedent.”). 
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Whitehurst v. Anderson, 228 N.C. 787, 788, 44 S.E.2d 358, 358 
(1947) (per curiam) (“The Court, one member not sitting, being 
evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is 
affirmed, accordant with the usual practice in such cases, and stands 
as the decision in this case, without becoming a precedent.”). 
MacClure v. Accident & Casualty Insurance Co. of Winterthur, 
Switzerland, 230 N.C. 661, 661, 55 S.E.2d 192, 192 (1949) (per curiam) 
(“The Court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the 
Superior Court is affirmed and stands as the decision in this case 
without becoming a precedent.”). 
James v. Rogers, 231 N.C. 668, 669, 58 S.E.2d 640, 640 (1950) 
(per curiam) (“One member of the Court . . . not sitting, and the 
remaining six being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the 
Superior Court stands affirmed after the manner of the usual practice 
in such cases, and as the disposition of the appeal, without becoming a 
precedent.”). 
Samuels v. Bowers, 232 N.C. 522, 522, 61 S.E.2d 448, 448 (1950) 
(per curiam) (“[T]he remaining members of the Court being equally 
divided in opinion, the petition to rehear is dismissed. The case as 
reported will remain the law of the case but does not constitute a 
precedent.”). 
State v. Brown, 242 N.C. 602, 602, 89 S.E.2d 157, 158 (1955) (per 
curiam) (“[T]he six sitting members being equally divided in 
opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, without 
becoming a precedent.”). 
Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Davenport, 242 N.C. 603, 
603, 89 S.E.2d 153, 153 (1955) (per curiam) (“[T]he six sitting 
members being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment of the 
Superior Court is affirmed, without becoming a precedent.”). 
State v. Smith, 243 N.C. 172, 172, 90 S.E.2d 328, 328 (1955) (per 
curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided in opinion . . . the judgment 
of the Superior Court is affirmed without becoming a precedent.”). 
Schoenith v. Town & Country Realty Co., 244 N.C. 601, 602, 94 
S.E.2d 592, 593 (1956) (per curiam) (“The members of the Court 
being evenly divided . . . the judgment below will be affirmed without 
becoming a precedent.”). 
Allen v. Southern Railway Co., 256 N.C. 700, 702, 124 S.E.2d 
871, 872 (1962) (per curiam) (“The Court being equally divided, the 
judgment below is affirmed. The judgment appealed from stands, but 
not as a precedent.”) rev’d by Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship 
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Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & State Employees v. Allen, 373 
U.S. 113 (1963). 
Burke v. Carolina & Northwestern Railway Co., 257 N.C. 683, 
683, 127 S.E.2d 281, 281 (1962) (per curiam) (“The other Justices, 
being equally divided . . . the judgment of the superior court is 
affirmed without the decision becoming a precedent.”). 
APPENDIX II.  NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT CASES IN 
WHICH THE JUSTICES WERE EQUALLY DIVIDED: 1967 TO 1985 
Parrish v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 271 N.C. 711, 711–12, 157 
S.E.2d 334, 334 (1967) (per curiam) (“The Court being evenly divided 
in opinion, three members of the Court being of the opinion that the 
demurrer should be sustained and three members of the Court being 
of the opinion that the demurrer should be overruled . . . the 
judgment of the lower court is affirmed after the manner of the usual 
practice of appellate courts in such cases and stands as the decision in 
this case without becoming a precedent.”). 
Sharpe v. Pugh, 286 N.C. 209, 210, 209 S.E.2d 456, 456–57 (1974) 
(per curiam) (“The six members of the Court who heard the appeal 
were equally divided . . . . This equal division requires that the 
decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed without becoming a 
precedent.”). 
In re Willis, 286 N.C. 207, 208, 209 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1974) (per 
curiam) (“[T]he members of the Court were equally divided, three 
members voting to affirm and three members voting to reverse the 
judgment of the superior court. This equal division requires that the 
judgment entered in the superior court be affirmed without becoming 
a precedent.”). 
State v. Johnson, 286 N.C. 331, 332–33, 210 S.E.2d 260, 260 
(1974) (per curiam) (“The remaining six justices being equally divided 
in opinion . . . the judgment of the Superior Court stands affirmed in 
accordance with the usual practice in such cases and decides this case 
without becoming a precedent.”). 
Townsend v. Norfolk & Southern Railway Co., 296 N.C. 246, 
249, 249 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1978) (per curiam) (“The remaining six 
justices are equally divided . . . . Thus, the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed without precedential value in accordance with the 
usual practice in this situation.”). 
State v. Oxner, 297 N.C. 44, 46–47, 252 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1979) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining six justices are equally 
divided . . . . Thus, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed 
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without precedential value in accordance with the usual practice in 
this situation.”). 
Wachovia Mortgage Co. v. Autry-Barker-Spurrier Real Estate, 
Inc., 297 N.C. 696, 697, 256 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1979) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining six justices are equally divided . . . . Therefore, the decision 
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed without precedential value in 
accordance with the usual practice in this situation.”). 
State v. Greene, 298 N.C. 268, 269, 258 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1979) (per 
curiam) (“The remaining six justices are equally divided . . . . In 
accordance with the usual practice and long established rule, this 
equal division requires that the judgment of the trial court be 
affirmed without becoming a precedent.”). 
Starr v. Clapp, 298 N.C. 275, 277, 258 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1979) (per 
curiam) (“The remaining six justices are equally divided . . . . Thus, 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed without precedential 
value in accordance with the usual practice in this situation.”). 
Shields v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 300 N.C. 366, 370, 266 
S.E.2d 658, 660 (1980) (per curiam) (“The remaining six justices 
are equally divided . . . . Accordingly, the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed without precedential value.”). 
Wayfaring Home Inc. v. Ward, 301 N.C. 518, 519–20, 272 S.E.2d 
121, 122 (1980) (per curiam) (“The justices are equally divided as to 
whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed or 
reversed. Chief Justice Branch and Justices Britt and Carlton vote to 
affirm; Justices Huskins, Copeland and Exum vote to reverse. 
Therefore, in accordance with our practice, the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is left undisturbed without precedential value.”). 
Greenhill v. Crabtree, 301 N.C. 520, 522, 271 S.E.2d 908, 909 
(1980) (per curiam) (“The remaining six Justices are equally 
divided . . . . In accordance with the usual practice and long 
established rule, this equal division requires that the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals be affirmed without precedential value.”). 
Felton v. Hospital Guild of Thomasville, Inc., 307 N.C. 121, 
121–22, 296 S.E.2d 297, 297 (1982) (per curiam) (“[T]he members of 
this Court being equally divided, with three members voting to affirm, 
and three members voting to reverse, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is left undisturbed as the law of the case but stands without 
precedential value.”). 
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APPENDIX III.  NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT CASES IN 
WHICH THE JUSTICES WERE EQUALLY DIVIDED: 1985 TO 2013 
Eason v. Gould, Inc., 312 N.C. 618, 618, 324 S.E.2d 223, 224 
(1985) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of this Court being 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm the Court of 
Appeals and three members voting to reverse, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential 
value.”). 
Lynch v. Hazelwood, 312 N.C. 619, 619, 324 S.E.2d 224, 224 
(1985) (per curiam) (“The Court is evenly divided. Under these 
circumstances, following the uniform practice of this Court and the 
ancient rule of praesumitur pro negante,113 the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed, not as precedent but as the decision in this 
case.”). 
Forbes Homes, Inc. v. Trimpi, 313 N.C. 168, 169, 326 S.E.2d 30, 
30 (1985) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of this Court being 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm the Court of 
Appeals and three members to reverse, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential value.”). 
State v. Moore, 317 N.C. 144, 144, 343 S.E.2d 430, 430 (1986) 
(per curiam) (“The Court is evenly divided. Under these 
circumstances, following the uniform practice of this Court and the 
ancient rule of praesumitur pro negante, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed, not as precedent but as the decision in this 
case.”). 
Vick v. Davis, 317 N.C. 328, 328–29, 345 S.E.2d 217, 217 (1986) 
(per curiam) (“[T]he Court is evenly divided. Under these 
circumstances, following the uniform practice of this Court, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, not as precedent but as 
the decision in this case.”). 
E.F. Blankenship Co. v. North Carolina Department of 
Transportation, 318 N.C. 685, 685, 351 S.E.2d 293, 293 (1987) (per 
curiam) (“The Court is evenly divided. Under these circumstances, 
following the uniform practice of this Court and the ancient rule of 
praesumitur pro negante, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed, not as precedent but as the decision in this case.”). 
Campbell v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc., 321 N.C. 260, 
266, 362 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1987) (“The remaining members of the 
Court are equally divided on the issue presented, with three members 
 
 113. Usually in the form semper praesumitur pro negante, the maxim refers to a 
presumption in favor of the negative. 
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voting to affirm the Court of Appeals and three members voting to 
reverse. The decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue is thus left 
undisturbed and stands without precedential value.”). 
Hochheiser v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, 
321 N.C. 117, 117, 361 S.E.2d 562, 562 (1987) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining members of this Court were equally divided with three 
members voting to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
three members voting to reverse. Therefore, the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential 
value.”). 
Bruce v. Memorial Mission Hospital, Inc., 325 N.C. 541, 541, 
385 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1989) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of 
this Court were equally divided with three members voting to affirm 
the decision of the Court of Appeals and three members voting to 
reverse. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left 
undisturbed and stands without precedential value.”). 
Kempson v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources, 
328 N.C. 722, 723, 403 S.E.2d 279, 279 (1991) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining members of the Court are equally divided, with three 
members voting to affirm, and three members voting to reverse, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential 
value.”). 
Polk v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 
328 N.C. 730, 730, 403 S.E.2d 255, 255 (1991) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining members of this Court were equally divided with three 
members voting to affirm the decision of the Superior Court and 
three members voting to reverse. Therefore, the decision of the 
Superior Court is left undisturbed and stands without precedential 
value.”). 
Nesbit v. Howard, 333 N.C. 782, 782, 429 S.E.2d 730, 731 (1993) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
Proctor v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 
335 N.C. 533, 535, 439 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1994) (“The remaining 
members of the Court are equally divided with three members voting 
to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals . . . and three members 
voting to reverse. Accordingly, that portion of the decision of the 
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Court of Appeals . . . is left undisturbed and stands without 
precedential value.”). 
Tate v. Christy, 339 N.C. 731, 731, 454 S.E.2d 242, 242 (1995) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
County of Lenoir v. Moore, 340 N.C. 104, 104, 455 S.E.2d 158, 
158 (1995) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Peal by Peal v. Smith, 340 N.C. 352, 352, 457 S.E.2d 599, 599 
(1995) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 372, 481 S.E.2d 14, 24 
(1997) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally divided on 
this issue, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, as 
to this issue, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Shakelford v. City of Wilmington, 349 N.C. 222, 222, 505 S.E.2d 
80, 80 (1998) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Reese v. Barbee, 350 N.C. 60, 60, 510 S.E.2d 374, 374 (1999) (per 
curiam) (Chief Justice Mitchell and Associate Justices Parker and 
Wainwright voted to affirm and Associate Justices Frye, Lake and 
Orr voted to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Hayes v. Town of Fairmont, 350 N.C. 81, 81, 511 S.E.2d 638, 638 
(1999) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1719 (2015) 
2015] WITHOUT PRECEDENTIAL VALUE 1751 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Roman v. Southland Transportation Co., 350 N.C. 549, 555, 515 
S.E.2d 214, 218 (1999) (“With Chief Justice Mitchell and Justices 
Lake and Wainwright voting to affirm and Justices Frye, Parker and 
Orr voting to reverse, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed 
without precedential value.”). 
Hearne v. Sherman, 350 N.C. 612, 616, 516 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1999) 
(“The remaining members of the Court being equally divided, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed without precedential 
value.”). 
Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 351 N.C. 92, 93, 520 S.E.2d 
785, 785 (1999) (per curiam) (“Justices Lake, Martin, and Wainwright 
believe that the error was prejudicial to the appealing defendant and 
would vote to grant a new trial. Chief Justice Frye and Justices Parker 
and Orr are of the opinion that the error was not prejudicial to the 
appealing defendant and would vote to affirm the result reached by 
the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential value.”). 
Medical Mutual Insurance Co. of North Carolina v. Mauldin, 
353 N.C. 352, 353, 543 S.E.2d 478, 478 (2001) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining members of the Court are equally divided, with three 
members voting to affirm and three members voting to reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential 
value.”). 
Pitts v. American Security Insurance Co., 356 N.C. 292, 293, 569 
S.E.2d 647, 647–48 (2002) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of 
the Court were equally divided, with two members voting to affirm 
the decision of the Court of Appeals and two members voting to 
reverse. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left 
undisturbed and stands without precedential value.”). 
Robinson v. Byrd, 356 N.C. 608, 608, 572 S.E.2d 781, 782 (2002) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court were equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm the decision of the 
Court of Appeals and three members voting to reverse. Therefore, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
Crawford v. Commercial Union Midwest Insurance Co., 356 
N.C. 609, 609, 572 S.E.2d 781, 781 (2002) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining members of the Court were equally divided, with three 
members voting to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
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three members voting to reverse. Therefore, the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential 
value.”). 
State v. Holden, 359 N.C. 60, 60, 602 S.E.2d 360, 360 (2004) (per 
curiam) (“The members of the Court are equally divided, with three 
members voting to affirm and three members voting to reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential 
value.”) (internal footnote omitted). 
Currituck Associates-Residential Partnership v. Hollowell, 360 
N.C. 160, 160, 622 S.E.2d 493, 493 (2005) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining members of the Court are equally divided, with three 
members voting to affirm and three members voting to reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential 
value.”). 
Barham v. Hawk, 360 N.C. 358, 358, 625 S.E.2d 778, 778 (2006) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
State v. Harrison, 360 N.C. 394, 394, 627 S.E.2d 461, 461 (2006) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
State v. Bauberger, 361 N.C. 105, 105, 637 S.E.2d 536, 536 (2006) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
Ripellino v. North Carolina School Boards Association, 361 
N.C. 214, 215, 639 S.E.2d 441, 442 (2007) (per curiam) (“[T]he 
members of the Court are equally divided. Therefore, those portions 
of the Court of Appeals opinion are affirmed without precedential 
value.”). 
Formyduval v. Britt, 361 N.C. 215, 216, 639 S.E.2d 443, 443 
(2007) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
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members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Masood v. Erwin Oil Co., 361 N.C. 579, 579, 650 S.E.2d 595, 595 
(2007) (per curiam) (“[T]he members of the Court are equally 
divided. Therefore, the Court of Appeals opinion is left undisturbed 
without precedential value.”). 
Williams v. Vonderau, 362 N.C. 76, 76, 653 S.E.2d 144, 144–45 
(2007) (per curiam) (“[T]he members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed without precedential value.”). 
Weaver v. Sheppa, 362 N.C. 341, 342, 661 S.E.2d 733, 733 (2008) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
Hall v. Toreros II, Inc., 363 N.C. 114, 114, 678 S.E.2d 656, 656 
(2009) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Heatherly v. State, 363 N.C. 115, 115, 678 S.E.2d 656, 657 (2009) 
(per curiam) (“[T]he remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
Goldston v. State, 364 N.C. 416, 416–17, 700 S.E.2d 223, 223 
(2010) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
State v. Long, 365 N.C. 5, 5, 705 S.E.2d 735, 735 (2011) (per 
curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally divided, 
with three members voting to affirm and three members voting to 
reverse the order of the superior court. Accordingly, the order of the 
superior court is affirmed.”). 
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State v. Pastuer, 365 N.C. 287, 287, 715 S.E.2d 850, 850 (2011) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 365 N.C. 305, 306, 716 
S.E.2d 849, 850 (2011) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the 
Court are equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and 
three members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Baysden v. State, 366 N.C. 370, 370, 736 S.E.2d 173, 173 (2013) 
(per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally 
divided, with three members voting to affirm and three members 
voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
Ochsner v. Elon University, 366 N.C. 472, 473, 737 S.E.2d 737, 
738 (2013) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
Gonzalez v. Worrell, 366 N.C. 501, 502, 739 S.E.2d 552, 552 
(2013) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
John Conner Construction, Inc. v. Grandfather Holding Co., 
366 N.C. 547, 547, 742 S.E.2d 802, 802 (2013) (per curiam) (“The 
remaining members of the Court are equally divided, with three 
members voting to affirm and three members voting to reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals stands without precedential value.”). 
State v. Hough, 367 N.C. 79, 79, 743 S.E.2d 174, 174 (2013) (per 
curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are equally divided, 
with three members voting to affirm and three members voting to 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands 
without precedential value.”). 
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State v. Craven, 367 N.C. 51, 58, 744 S.E.2d 458, 462 (2013) 
(“The six participating members of the Court are equally 
divided . . . . Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left 
undisturbed and stands without precedential value.”). 
State v. Pizano-Trejo, 367 N.C. 111, 111, 748 S.E.2d 144, 144 
(2013) (per curiam) (“The remaining members of the Court are 
equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three 
members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed 
and stands without precedential value.”). 
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